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Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices, 1920'sand Post-W.W.11 55
than formerly. The shift is not attributable to thechanging mix of the
wholesale price index, because the distributions arecomposer1 ol the
same set of 1,1 00-odd wholesaleproduct prices. A rightwarcl shift in
the distributions of the rates of price change inrecessions occurs in
part because the trend of the rates hasincreased over the postwar
period. But the diminishing response of prices to recessions isalso
evident in the distributions of changes in the ratesof price change from
cyclical expansions to succeeding recessions, which are notaffected
by the trend of the rates. ¶ There hasclearly been a gradual decline
in price response to recessions over the postwarperiod, except mainly
for raw materials prices. Further analysis showsthat its not confined
to high valued-added orconcentrated manufacturing industries, or to
the use of BLS reported prices rather thanthe transactions prices
presented in the Stigler-Kindahl study. The interpretationoffered here is
that an intensification of general anticipationsof inflation over the
postwar period has lessened the responseof manufacturing prices to
short-run variations in demand. This hascontributed to the postwar
difficulty of curbing inflation through policyrestraints on aggregate
demand.
INTRODUCTION
Although cyclical fluctuations in businessactivity have on the whole been
milder since World War II than everbefore and price increases during
cyclical expansions (before 1973)have been correspondingly moderate,
prices have declined less thanthey used to in periods of mildbusiness
recession, with the result thatthe price level has risen to higherand higher
levels with no significant reversals.This change in the cyclicalbehavior of
prices lies at the heart of the"inflation problem" in the postwarperiod.
The present study examines therecession behavior of wholesaleprices
since World War II and comparesit with the mild recessionsof the 1920's.
The focus is on changes in recessionbehavior, possible bias in thedata,
and differences in behavior amongvarious groups of wholesaleprices.
(Differences between wholesale and consumerprices, though important,
are not examinedhere.) The purpose is toextend the evidence on the
extent and uniformity ofchanges in price behavior and totest various
interpretations of those changes.
The Reduction of CyclicalAmplitude in Aggregate
Price Indexes
Table 1 shows the cyclical behaviorof the Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS)































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































processed foods. In the four businessrecessions k)lloWing J 94(3 theaggre- gate index did nol decline andin the last threeitrose.In previous recessions this index had failedto decline only twice (in1 900 and th( short recession followingWorld War II in 1945).' In 1961an(l l97it even rose faster in the recessions than inthe precedingexpansions aperverse cyclical behavior which itnever exhibited before. The rate ofchange of the aggregate index is graphed in Chart1.
The index for all itemsexcluding foods, whichavoids the vagariesof agricultural supply conditions,shows a similar changein behavior Al- though this index declinedin all recessions since1891 except 1945and 1970, the declineswere much smaller in the fourfollowing 1949. In1970 this index exhibitedthe perverse cyclicalbehavior of therecessk)rl rate exceeding the expansionrate, which occurred onlyonce before, in 1894 Appendix Table A showsthe cyclical behaviorof three majorsubgroups of wholesale pricesavailable since 1912, basicniaterials, intermediate goods, and finishedgoods. A sharp declinein cyclical amplitudeOccurs for all three subgroupsin the recessions follo'ing1949, thus demonstrating that the decline forthe aggregate indexcannot be attributedto the decreasing seight ofthe volatile prices ofbasic materials. The rates of pricechange during businessexpansions have also de- clined, thoughnot uniforml, Someexpansions in the 1920'sand earlier had rates of pricechange as lowas or below those ofsome postwar cycles. Although ii wasnot unusual in thei920' and earlier forthe expansion rates to be low, itwas rare for pricesto fail to declineapprecial)ly in recessions Chart 1 makes thereduction in amplitudeof price fluctuations before and after1950 readilyapparent Such a reductionin month-to. month amplitude hasoccurred in othereconomic series as well,including the rate of growthof the money stock,It reflects inpart better data hut also the fact thatcycles in businessactivity have beenmilder on theaverage since World WarII than formerlyStill, a change inbehavior of pricesis evident even afterallowing fordifferences in thecyclical amplitude of business dCtIVIt.A pairing oftwo mild recessionsin the 1 950's withtwo in the l92O'at the boorn ofTable I shows thatthe !ater pricesings were considerablsmaller, though lessso for expansionrates alone Although expansionrates have come downthe currentexpanin since 1970 is anexceptioni at thesame time thatreceor rates have moedu toard and pastzero, recessionrates have movedfarther The presentstuds is generaUv





























































































































































































































































































Recession Behaviorof Wholesale I'flcec,1920's and Post-W.W.11
possible Bias inAggregate Indexes
Although the declinein measured pricechanges has been widelydis-
cussed, its statisticalbasis deserves reexamination.Because we want to
distinguish broadchanges in market behaviorfrom changes in statistical
compositiOIi of the data,there are several difficultiesin relying exclusively
on theaggregate indexes.They are disproportionatelYinfluenced by cer-
tain product groups,and the composition andweighting have shifted over
time towardthe less volatile pricesof manufactured goods.Although the
index of finishedgoods in Table A showsthe same change in cyclical
behavior as thatfor basic materials andintermediate goods, the composi-
tiori of each ofthese subindexes hasalso shifted over time; thesubstitution
of new series forold and increases in thetotal number have given more
weight to thehighly fabricated productswhich characteristically exhibit
less price fluctuation.A 1952 revision ofthe index reduced therecession
rate of declinefor intermediate andfinished goods, though notfor basic
materials, as is shownby the overlap inTable A.
A study byMcAllister3 found that an increasein the index from 550 to
784 items in 1931produced an average reductionin amplitude of 15 per
cent for cyclicalmovements in theperiod of overlap, 1926--31.For an
increase fromabout 900 to 1,900 itemsin 1952, the averagereduction in
amplitude was 21 percent for the periodof overlap, 1947-5 1.(These
amplitudes are based oncyclical highs and lows inthe index rather than
the change fromthe peak to the troughdates of business cycles asin Table
1, but they shouldbe indicative of theeffect of the revisions onthe Table 1
amplitudes.) The 1931and 1952 revisions encompassmost of the en-
largement from about530 items in theearly 1920's to about 2,100by
1960. Their combinedeffect on cyclicalamplitude was to reduce itby
one-third (.85 x .79 = .67).The actual reduction inamplitude, as Table 1
shows, was much greaterthan this.
McAllister's tables indicatethat nearly all thereduction after the first
revision was due to thereduced amplitude of thefinished goods index. For
the later revision, the1945-49 overlap inTable A shows thatall the
reduction occurred in thecomponentc for intermediateand finished goods;
the amplitude of thematerials componentactually rose. These reductions
appear to reflectthe addition of lessvolatile prices. Simplyadding niore
items, once the numberalready exceeds a fewhundred. would not reduce
the amplitude muchfurther.5
To avoid the problemof changing coverageand weighting, thepresent
study analyzes frequencydistributions of pricechanges for the same
products. Section ii presentsdistributions of subindexesof wholesale prices
for which the coverageof products hascontinued from the 1920's to1970
without major change. Theymake up most of theaggregate index inthea
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1 920's butonly half byweight in the 1960's. Thesesubindexes allowus to compare the behaviorof thesame price seriesin the two mild
recessions of
the 1 920'swith the fivealter WorldWar II. (The datesare those shownin Table 1.) The1930's and WorldWar II are omittedas not beingcompara- ble wIth themild postwarcycles. SectionIll analyzesfrequency distribu- tions of theprices of 1,100individual productswhich haveno gaps or major changesin specificationfrom 1947to 1970. SectionIV utilizesthe Stigler-Kindahl dataon prices collectedfrom buyers inorder to determine whether andto what extentBIS reports fromsellers are biased.These sectionsare designed toidentify andcircumvent possiblebias in the cyclical behaviorof theaggregate indexes.
PossibleExplanations ofthe Reductionin Cyclica' Amplitude
As a firststep towardexplanation of thechanges in pricebehavior, Section o V analyzesprices accordingto threecharacteristics ofproducts and e markets: thedegree of processingand durabilityof products, thefraction of 48 value added inproduction, and themarket concentrationof firms. These av three werechosen becausethey are relevantto various theoriesof price 19 behavior and alsobecause thenecessary data areavailable. Durable i products are heldin inventory,high value addedreflects a preponderance of wagecosts, and highmarketconcentration can leadto tacit collusionor i strategies on pricing.All of theseare thought to makeprices less subjectto shifts in demandand less variable.It is conceivablethat the effectson th prices ofwages and concentration
have intensifiedover the postwar period
tu to produce theobserved dedinein theresponse of prices torecessions. A grouping of pricesby the degreeto which theyare subject to each ofthese characteristics helpsto determine theimportance of suchinfluences. ar Section VI summarizesand interpretsthe findings.An importantquestion rn about changesin price behavioris the effect ofinflationary anticipations
go compared withthe effect ofdevelopments inthe structure ofproduct markets. Anticipationshave presumablybeen influencedby the postwar
19 policy commitmentto maintain fullemployment andmight be importantto g actual pricebehavior insofaras they heightened
uncertainty over thetrend sa
of pricesor otherwise madeprices lessresponsive to short-runfluctuations in demand. Onthe other hand,itis not clear howvarious structural
ch changes mightaffect pricebehavior. Theevidence hereshows certain differences in behaviorbased oct durabilityof product,market concentra- tion, and fractionof value addedin production.Except for differences between rawmaterials and other







































effects of a changing mix, showthe declining response to occur broadly
throughout manufacturing. Although no evidence onanticipations s pre-
sented, their effect on prices would be broadand would be consistent with
these results.
[III COMPARISONOF POST-WORLD WAR II WITH
THE 1920's
Does the long-run decline incyclical amplitude from the 1920's to
post-World War II pertain to most of theindividual price series or isit
largely a reflection of changes in thecomposition of the aggregate indexes?
it is desirable to examineindexes which have had little change in cover-
age. Price seriesfrom the 1920's to 1970 are available withoutbreaks for
only a small number ofindividual products, but many continuous series
exist for groups of essentiallythe same closely related products. There are
48 major component seriesof the wholesale price index which are
available from 1926 to 1970, and 44 ofthese can be extended back to
1923. The 48 series make up 93 per centby weight of the 1926 aggregate
index though only 50 per cent of the 1970index. (The 44 series make up
92 per cent of the 1924index.) These are mostly the second-level price
indexes in BIS coding which are justbelow the first level of industry
aggregates, though some availablethird-level series were substituted where
the corresponding second-levelindex began too late and did not cover the
full period. The 48 series are identifiedin Appendix Table B.
The components and internalweighting of these series have changed
over the years, of course,but the products covered by them haveremained
largely the same, except perhaps for a fewof the more highly fabricated
manufactures. These seriesnecessarily exclude groups which have under-
gone major productchanges, such as machinery(though agricultural
equipment is included), and groupswhich are entirely new since the
1920's, such as most chemicals andelectrical equipment. Manufactured
goods are included for some groupswhich have remained essentially the
same in functional purpose,such as automobiles, householdfurniture, and
footwear, though the specifications oftheir individual components have
changed over time. These changes inspecification do not greatly affect the
rates of price change within asingle business cycle, but over alonger
period such changes may reflect developmentsin the product which alter
price behavior. So far as these series areconcerned, such developments
cannot be distinguished from thechanges in coverage which accompany
them. Nevertheless, these 48 series,though of restricted importance inthe
later period, avoid much of the compositionand weighting bias of the
a
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an aggregate iv i.igs hvH of s-u h,eri's V.dS ( dl(UldtedTor the threemonths iii( inr ihi' juk,,,rd trough' j'',s.sNatronaBureau reference ii itwo iiiiIlss in tFu92(Ys ,rnd the fivesince World WarII 11w ,(. (p1( hrnge (Crui1sjunded ( ontinuously,irom peakto trough of siii hycle was ikulatedInc everyseries.These serieshave not been ssasinially adjusted,whih pfo)(JucesdistOrtion mainlyfor the highly seasiuvil farmpries in re essions of lengthother than 12 months (allbut 1')70). All the rates brear h recssionwere classifiedas being inone of 14 intervals from- 2() to 10 per centper year; therdth of eachinterior interval is 2/2percentage points andthe twoextreme classesare open- ended. Zerowas marie the beginningof the firstpositive interval inorder is) distinguish pricedeclines fromno change. tTheplotted frequenciesare the percentage ofrates up to hutnot including therates shcss'non the horizontal axis.
The resultsare presented intwo sets ofdistributions forthe seven recessions: one inChart 2 of therates of change inrecessions; and the other in Chart3 of the rates forrecessions lfl relation
to expansions, thatis, the recessionrate for each seriesminus its preceding
expansion rate.
Rates of Changein Recessions
Chari ' showsthat thedistributions shiftin successiverecessions toward smaller negativeand largerpositive rates ofchange, except thedistribution for 1949 whichlies to the leftof most of the1927 distributionand of the upper half of the1924 distribution.In the 1949recession, pricesdeclined from the inflatedlevels carriedover from wartime,so that this episodenay not representtypical peacetimebehavior. The distributionsfor 1927,1949, and 1970have similarshapes and differ mainlyin horizontal
position. Comparedwith these three,the dispersion ofprice changesis muchgreater for 1 924,as indicated by its flatness, andmuch less forthe threerecessions from1954 to 1961.as indicated bytheirsteepness. Dispersionis discussedfurther later. The successiverightward shiftsof the distributionsexcept for 1949are summarized byvariousmeasures of theaverage price change inTable 2. The twoconstant-weightmean rates differfrom the rate ofchange of the aggregate index inthe lastcolumn, reproducedhere from Table1, not only


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rTABLE 2Mean and Median ofthe Rates ofChange of 48Subindexes of Wholesale Pricesin Seven MildRecessions (per cent per year)
Mean Rate of -
Change of t Weights of
Aggregate th Recession MedianUnweighted1926k 1970h
Index
in
8y 1928 weights the48 subindexescover 93.1 pet cent ofthe total index. b8y 1970 weightsthe 48 subindexes
cover 50.5 per cent of thetotal index. 'Forty-four series only,which cover 92.0per cent by 1924 weights
and 92.8 per centby 1926 weights. 20
nn.c. indicatesnd computed.
the rate ofchange is calculatedafter the levelsof thecomponent series have beenaveraged.
Thesemeasures of priceresponse rank therecessions generallyin the same order, but theuse of weights doeslead tosome sizable differences. For the last threerecessions inparticular, theweighted indexesreduce the
tO
rightward shiftsshown by theunweightedmean and median. Theweighted indexes rank the1958 and 1961recessions out ofchronological order, while the medianand unweightedmean showprogressive rightwardshifts in the postwar
distributions! Theweights attachmore importanceto prices which happenedto risemore in 1958.
Weighted indexesare generally preferableas indicators ofaggregate behavior,but theycan unduly em- 111
phasizedevelopments ina relatively smallnumber of marketsfor which
The
the value ofshipments underlyingthe weightsis very large.
data
on
Changes inRates of Changefrom Expansion
char
to Recession
To derive thedistributions ofChart 3, theexpansion ratesfor each series were calculated forthe sevencycles andsubtracted fromthe succeeding
prco
recession rates.The subtractionremoves any trendsin the rates ofprice change. Theexpansionsran from the troughto the peak ofthe business cycles, modifiedfor four of thecycles. Calendar-year
averages were used
ad
for thebeginning of thetwo expansionsin 1921 and1924 instead ofthe
three monthssurrounding thetroughs becausenot all the neededmonthly


















data have been published. (The use of annual averages reduces the
magnitude and probably the dispersion of the expansion rates. Also, four of
the subindexes are not available before 1926, so here the 1927 as well as
the 1924 distribution comprises only 44 series.) The first expansion after
World War II was shortened to run from February 1947 to November 1948
in order to conform to the period used later in Section III where data before
1947 are not available. And the last expansion was started in December
1965 instead of the 1961 trough, because the inflationary second ha!f of
this unusualy long phase seemed more appropriate for these purposes than
the lull period. Except for the two truncated phases, the difference between
recession and expansion rates is equivalent to a measure of total cyclical
amplitude.
All seven distributions in Chart 3 lie further to the left than their mates in
Chart 2 for recession rates alone, because expansion rates are typically
positive and the subtraction moves the recession ratesin a negative
direction. The distributions in Chart 3 are also generally flatter, indicating
greater dispersion among the components.
The post-World War II distributions shift progressively to the right, as is
especially apparent from the medians and percentages of declining series.
These shifts, which are more prominent here than in Chart 2, are nota
mechanical result of the method of computation. Even when the rates have
an upward trend as was true in the 1960's, there is no arithmetical reason
for the change in rates of change from expansions to succeeding recessions
to be higher or lower than in previous cycles. Even allowing for escalating
price trends, therefore, recession responses have attenuated.
11111 CHANGES SINCE WORLD WAR II
The subindexes used above are adequate to demonstrate a decline in
amplitude and dispersion of price responses since the 1920's, but those
data lack breadth of coverage and precision. Since they are subject to not
only internal changes in weighting, which are generally minor, but also to
changes in components, which may often be important, composition bias
is not absent. We may obtain a more precise picture of changes in cyclical
behavior since World War IIby confining the analysis to individual
product prices (the fifthlevel of the BLS code). Although few of the
individual price series comprising the wholesale price index span the
period from the 1920's to 1970, 1,106 run from 1947 to 1970, and an
additional 32 series cover all but the 1970 recession. These 1,100-odd
price series are all that the BIS publishes which have no break and pertain
to the same product over the period, though even these undergo unavoid-
Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices, 1920's and Post-W.W.II 6768
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able minor changesfrom time to timein the specificationof productsThe coverage by industry is shownin Appendix TableC.
Magnitude of PriceResponses
The cumulativefrequency distributionsof the rates of changein recessjoiis of these 1,138 priceseries are presented inChart 4. (Although32 series are omitted from the 1970distribution this makeslittle difference)As before, the series havenot been seasonallyadjusted. Thesedistributionsare broadly thesame in shape andposition as those in Chart2, but alsoare smoother and providea sharper picture ofdifferences between thereces- sions. Chart 4 differsfroni Chart 2mainly in thecenter segment of the distributions which issteeper here__showing lessdisperSion_because of the inclusion ofmany more of the lessvolatile prices ofmanufactured goods. The middlethree distributionsfor 1954, 1958,and 1961, whichare very Close together,are steeper aroundzero than the othertwo, suggesting a downward rigidity ofprices in which therates bunch at lowpositive rates (mainly zero). Thisbunching reducesthe number ofdeclining series in these threerecessions to almost 30per cent; this is discussedin Section IV. The bunchingat zero partlyobscures the relativePosition of the distribu- tions, though theyclearly shiftrightwarcj fromrecession to recession.As was done for Chart3, we may eliminatemost of the zero bunchingand obtain moredistinctive distributionsby taking thechanges in rates of change fromexpansion to recession.This is presentedin Chart 5 for the same 1,100-odd seriescovered by Chart 4. Theexpansions run from the trough to the peakwith theexceptions Previouslyused for the firstand last cycles: the firstruns from February 1947to the 1948 peakbecause most of the seriesare not available earlier,and the secondruns froni December 1 965 to the 1969peak in orderto focus on theinflationary second halfof that phase. Thetruncation of thesetwo phasesgenerally increasesthe measured expansionrates of price changeand so tends toturn the changes in rates fromexpansion to recessioninto largernegative numbers. Thusthe 1949 distributionstands out evenmore here than in Chart4 because its shortexpansion periodcatches the bulgein prices followingthe termina- tion of World Warii price controlsin mid-i 946and records highrates of change andmoves the distributionof changes inthe rates to theleft. Chart 5 can beviewed asmeasuring therecession rate of eachprice relative toitstrend, where thetrendis estimated bythe preceding expansion rate. (A better
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-zero. Consequently,ifa price has a high expansion rate, the ensuing
recession rate may be lower but can still he a comparatively high positive
rate. The postwar phenomenon of inflationary movements persisting in the
face of slack markets reflects the carry-over of expansion rates, with only
small reductions, on the average, into recessions.
The significant development in the postwar period is that, despite a
reduction in amplitude of price expansions, inflation persisted because of a
decline in the response of rates of price change to recessions. As shown in
Chart 5, the responses have progressively declined fairly uniformly along
the entire range of price changes except for the very large declines. By
1 970 the median response of the rates to recession was slightly positive.
The magnitude of the decline in responses is recorded by two measures o
the distributions in Table 3. By the mean or median, the changes in the
rates from expansion to recession (bottom section) became less negative or
more positive in sequence from one recession to the next. The rates of
change themselves (top section) also moved in a positive direction, though
not entirely in sequence. The 1966-67 minirecession has been added to
TABLE 3Mean and Median of the Distribution of Rates of
Change of 1,100-odd Wholesale Prices in Post-World
War II Recessions (per cent per year)






Recession Rates Minus Preceding Expansion Rates
NOTE:Expansion periods are February 1947 to November 1948, October 1949 to July 1953, August
1954 to July 1957 April 1958 to May 1960, and December 1965 to November 1969. Recession
periods are given in Table 1. Dates for the 1966-67 minirecession are November 1966 to Ma
1967, and the preceding expansion period begins in February 1961.
Number of seiiesis 1,138 for 1947-61, 1,106 (or 1969-70, and 1,131 for966-.67.
70 Phillip Cagari



















Rece5SOfl Behavior of Wholesale Prices, 1920's and Post-W.W.I 71
the bottom group toprovide a further test of the chronology of the shifts in
price behavior. It falls in its chronological order for the median and is only
slightly out of order with 1961 for the mean.
The severity of postwar business cycles has generally been decreasing in
real terms, which conceivably might account for the declining response of
prices. This cannot be saidof the decline in response from the 1920's to
the later postwar recessions, because that decline is too large to reflect the
small differences in severity But it is a possible reason for the declines
following 1949. The evidence on this point has been assembled in Chart 7.
Various measures of the distributions of recession-minus-expansion rates
are plotted for thefive postwar recessions and the 1966-67 minirecession.
The chart graphs the distributional measures of Table 3 and Table 5
(presented later), the change in rate of change of the weighted aggregate
index, and the change from peak to trough rates of corresponding specific
cycles in the industrial component of the aggregate. A ranking of the
severity of the recessions in business activityis also presented. (This
ranking omits the expansions. The severity of the total amplitude of cycles
in business activity including the expansions has also been diminishing,
but by less.)
All the measures of price response decrease over the period as a whole,
and the median and percentage of declining rates show significant de-
creases from each recession to the next. Here the slight overall response of
prices to the 1970 recession does not appear as a new phenomenon but as
simply another step in the postwar progression. By contrast, the ranks of
severity do not decrease in exact sequence: 1949 and 1958 tied for most
severe and 1961 and 1970 tied for next to least severe. None of the price
measures follow the time pattern of the ranks. The price responses in the
1966-67 niinirecession are conspicuously out of order with its severity.
Based on this evidence, therefore, the diminishing response of prices
appears to have occurred sequentially, due presumably to a set of institu-
tional and expectational developments, and not due solely to the overall
reduction in severity of recessions, thoughit no doubt contributed.8
It also appears that the degree of inflation in the expansion is not crucial
either, because the 1958 distribution in Chart 5 followed upon a more
inflationary expansion than did the 1961 distribution which is farther to the
right.
Since the response of prices to recessions has progressively diminished,
it is natural to ask whether the time lag of theresponse has lengthened. To
provide an answer we may examine the distribution of price changes for
the eight months following each trough. Thisspan was selected because it
terminates the first cycle in June 1950 as prices erupted at the outbreak of
the Korean War, and the last cycle in August 1971as a price freeze was

















ed toCHART 7Severity of Post-WorldWar H Recessions
and Measures of Price Response(midpoint ofrecessions)
Index of IndustrialWholesale Prices
Sever ilof Recessions-
FL1StOJI1k is roost sesere)
Rank of seserity: Animal
Report )Nw Yolk: National
Bureau of Economic Research,1973). p. lB. Index of Industrial
Wholesale Prices: GeoffreyH. Moore,Price Behavior During Growth Recessions," Per9.ctiw'srio !nfJatrrjn, The CofernceBoard in Canada, 1974,Tahle 4, p. 30. Index of all wholesale
prices: same as TableI except that expansionfor firstycle is Fe&uary 1947 to November194g. for mtnirecx'ssionof November1966-May 191,7 ix Februar,1961 to
NovemberI 966, and for lestcycle ix December1965 to NovemberIrn'S.I - 100-odd whi,Iesale pIties: Tables3 and 5.
P(l( I' responses ShOW
recession rates minus preceding
expansion rates except brthe index of industral wholesaleprices, which shows the
difference between thetrough and preceding peak rates ofhange centered xis-month
averages) for specific cyclesin the rate of change of tIne index uirresç,ondrng
to business cycles.Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices,1920's and Post-W.W.II 75
the recessions after 1949 is anotherindication, along with unchanged
dispersion, that the decline inresponse of price changes does not reflect
major shifts in the distribution of price changesacross the economy.
LIVI THE BUNCHING OF PRICE CHANGES IN THEMIDDLE
OF THE DISTRIBUTIONS
Two related characteristics of the distributionsof price changes deserve
closer examination. First, the rates of changeduring recessions bunch at
zero, as noted, indicating a tendency for a large number ofprices to
remain unchanged. This has been discussed in the literatureas downward
rigidity of prices and has been attributedto a statistical bias in the BLS
indexes due to a failure to catch market discountingand shading of prices
or, alternatively, to a tendency of prices in Iact notto decline in slack
markets due to the rigidity of so-called "administered'prices."
The distributions for recession-minus-expansionrates do not exhibit this
characteristic to the same degree when the trendof prices is significantly
upward, since firms can reduce the rate of priceincrease without reducing
the absolute level. But the changes inrates do exhibit a related characteris-
tic of bunching at the mean, which is measured bya high kurtosis. This
reflects a tendency of prices to changeat the sanie rate during recessions
as during the preceding expansion and is symmetrical betweenincreases
and decreases, in contrast to downward rigidity in whichthe level of many
prices does not fall. Downward rigidity doesnot preclude a reduction in a
positive rate of change, and therefore the two phenomena,though produc-
ing similar statisticaldistributions, appear to have different economic
explanations.
The Bunching of Recession Ratesat Zero
Bunching at zero was noted in Charts2 and 4. It is indicated there by the
jump in the cumulative frequency in the 0to 2Y2 interval, which is plotted
at 21/2. Tabulations not shown indicate thatmost of the bunching repre-
sents zero price changes. Since many prices change infrequently,a short
recession would register more zero changes thanwould a long recession.
The recessions studied herevary from 9 to 14 months, not enough
variation to make a great difference.
A small percentage of declining series issometimes taken to indicate
such bunching, hut the unrelated rightward shiftsin the distributions can
account for the reduction in the percentage declining. Anotherpossible
indication of bunching is leftwarci skewnessasmeasured by the meanFIGURE 1Hypothetical Distributions of Rates of Price Change
Symmetrical (dotted) and Bunched at Zero (solid)
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NOTE,For explanation of eIirnated per cent declining,coo lest
minus the medianbut this may result fromvery large rates of decline in a
subgroup of volatile prices. Tomeasure the effect on the distributions due
to bunching per Se. we may rely on a simple method illustratedin Figure 1
and calculated for the postwar recessionsin Table 5. Bunching at zero is
illustrated in Figure 1 by the solidcurve relative to a symmetrical distribu-
tion (dotted).
the method is basedon the assumption that a distribution without
bunching would be symmetrical around themean. The measure of bunch-
ing is the ratio of the actualpercentage declining to the hypothetical
percentage for a symmetrical distribution. A lowerratio indicates more
bunching, and unity irtdicatesno bunching. The hypothetical percentage is
approximated by assuming that the frequency ofprice changes above 2½
per cent per year is unaffected by the bunching atzero. Given a symmetri-TABLE 5Measures of Bunching at Zero in the Distribution of
Rates of Change of 1,100-odd Wholesale Prices
in Post-World War II Recessions
Recessions
Ratio of Actual to
Per Cent Flypothetical Per Cent
Declining Decliningu










1960-6 1 56.9 .97
1969-70 43.7 .89
1966-67 48.5 nc.5
NOTE:Dates and number 01 series are the same as for Tables 3 and 4.
The hypothetical per cent declining is based on a symmetrical distribution. See Figure 1and lest
explanation.
ncndicater, fltoiiiputtl.
cal distribution, the frequency above 2½ per cent equals the frequency
below a point equidistant to the left of the mean. The distribution between
these two points is assumed to lie along a straight line (in that middle range
the distributions with little bunching do appear to be linear), and the
hypothetical percentage of declining prices is read from this line. This
percentage isbiased downwards, thus overstating the bunching ratio,
because bunching increases the mean. Recalculation of the ratio with an
adjusted mean to correct for this bias indicates that this overstatement of
the ratio is minor. (The corrected ratio for 1961 is reduced from .59 to .54.)
By this measure of bunching, the ratio was largest for the recession rates
in 1961, which had only 59 per cent of the hypothetical number of
declining prices, and almost as large in 1954 and 1958. The bunching was
somewhat less in 1948 because so many prices declined sharply in that
recession, and it was considerably less in 1970 because the hypothetical
percentage declining was small.
The phenomenon of price changes bunching at zero has received wide
attention.It has been attributed to the rigidity of 'administered" prices,
which allegedly do not respond to shortrun shifts in demand. Chart 4
demonstrated its prevalence in postwar recessions. Could it be simply a//1
'' statistical artifact of the data? Forprices fixed by contract,for exampleno change occurs until theyare reset (assuming noprearranged escalation)It is not clear howmany of the BIS series reflectcontract prices. Even for
noncontract prices, the BLS compilesreports from sellers whomay fail to report (though requested to doso) the uflannounce(Jdiscounting and shading of prices often madein actual transactions.
We may analyze thisomission with the aid of theNational Bureau collection of prices compiledfrom buyers, largely ofproducts for which "administered pricing"was likely to be strong.'These datacover the 1958 and 1961 recessions only.Chart 8 presents threesets of cumulative
frequency distributions of 62National Bureau pricegroupings compilj by Stigler and Kindahi and thecorresponding BLS indexes.Two panels show the 1958 and 1961recession rates, and the thirdpanel showsrecessjon minus-expansion rates for 1961.
Itis apparent that the BLSseries underreport pricedecreases, mainly small ones. The paireddistributions are fairly closeexcept between and 2½ or 5per cent per year. Itis clear from theunderlying datanot shown here that the mainexception occurs atzero. This result Presumably
reflects a tendency of thequoted or list pricesreported to the BLSto omit market shading whenno change in the list price hasOccurred, but to include them when the marketstrays too far from the listprice and the list is changed. Thus thepaired price series displaythe same cyclicalbehavior overall, as is indicated bya correlation coefficient betweenthe two sets of price changes for 1958of .81. (This correlationwas not computed for 1961, but it wouldgive similar results.)
The rightmost panelof the chart which showschanges in therates of price change reveals similardifferences between thesetwo sets of data. Although such changesin rates of changeusually do not bunchat zero, the expansion rates for this cyclewere fairly small and partiallyreplicate the results for recessionrates alone.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bunching in the 313 seriesmainly reflects the omissionof market discount
ing from list prices.
If we take the differencein l)unching between the 313 and NBERdata in Chart 8 at face value, thepercentage of declining seriesreported in Table
can he adjusted for artificial bunching.The adjustment's raises thePercent. age of declining series from 30.5to 40.2 for 1958 and from3 1.2 to 48.9 for 1961. The ratio ofthese adjusted figuresto the hypotheticalpercentage declining in Table 5 is raisedfrom .66 to .87 for 1958and from .59 to .92 for 1961. The adjustmenttherefore accounts fora substantial part of the bunching, though apparentlynot all. The downward rigidityof wholesale prices, though not entirelya statistical artifact of list instead oftransaction prices, is certainly minor. Thepersistence of inflation sinceWorld War IIis not, therefore, diaracterized bydownward rigidity so muchas a general tendency of prices in thewhole range of rates ofchange to respond progressively less and less torecessions.
The Bunching ofRecessionmjnusExpans,on Rates
at the Mean
The distributions of therecessionnhintJsexpsion rates displaythe related phenomenon of extremely highkurtosis-_-that is, comparedwith the stand- ard normal distribution, theyare denser around themean and extended in the tails. Table 6 gives thesample kurtosis andstandard deviation for these distributions in thepostwar recessions. The kurtosis(a pure number) is many times the size expectedfrom a normal population,which is 3. A high kurtosis has been notedelsewhere as characteristicof distributions of price changesl4 More thanmost other economic variables,changes in pricesare
TABLE 6Kurtosis and StandardDeviation of Distributions
of Rates of Change ofWholesale Prices, Post-World
War II Recessions
(recession rates minuspreceding expansion rates)
Kurtosi
Standard deviation
(per cenr per year)
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abnormally clustered at a modal value (usually zero) relative totheir total
dispersion.
One common example is the sequence of pricediinges over time in
commodity markets, in which daily price changes are usuallysmall but
infrequently interspersed with very large changes.Such a sequence is not
pertinent here to price changes among products over the sameperiod of
time, however, Individual product prices deviate from the mean rateof
price change because of a large iiumber of influences, and we might atfirst
expect the combined effect to follow a normal frequencydistribution.
However, the central limit theorem for a normal distribution assumesthat
the probability distributions ot the contributing influences do not differ too
greatly, and this is not likely here. Basic commodity prices are typically
more volatile than the prices of highlyfabricated products, because of
differences in the operation of their respective markets. Even asidefrom
such characteristic differences among prices, the deflationary pressures of a
recession can hit diflerent sectors with varying severity and speed.
Table 6 shows considerable variation in kurtosis over the period.The
kurtosis of the 1949 distribution is the lowest and ifs standard deviationthe
highest, because the price changes are widely dispersed. This is evident
from examination of the histogram of its price changes (not shown).The
1954 and 1970 distributions have practically equal values inTable 6,
indicating that the fundamental determinants of the distributions had no
trend over this period. Relative to these two, the 1 958 distribution has a
high kurtosis and standard deviation because of a greater number of very
large values out in the tails, and the 1961 kurtosis is low becausethe
distribution isless peaked.
As an analytical explanation of these high values of kurtosis, we may
describe price changes in a recession as generated by a set of normal
distributions whose variances are not the same for each price. The variance
of the normal distribution from which each price change is drawn reflects
the degree of volatility and deflationary pressures among prices. Then the
kurtosis of the resulting distribution of price changes depends upon the
ratio of the variance to the mean (squared) of a generating distribution
which determines the variance of the normal distributions) The resulting
distribution of price changes has a kurtosis necessarily greater than the 3 of
a normal distribution.
In these terms a change in kurtosis reflects a change in the aforemen-
tioned generating distribution. An increase in the ratio of its variance to its
mean raises the kurtosis of the resulting distribution of pricechanges. On
certain assumptions an increase in uniformity of price anticipations among
firms would decrease the mean but not the variance of the generating
distribution, and hence would increase the ratio of variance to the mean
and also increase the kurtosis. Since kurtosis has not been increasing over82
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the inflationary postwar period,we might at first (Tondlide that theantici- pated rate of inflationeven though it rose, did not becomemore uniform
As is shown in the Appendix, however, theelleit of a greater uniformityof
price anticipations on the kurtosis isvery slight, and an inference about
their uniformity from the kurtosis ofthese distributions cannot bedrawn.
lvi PRICES GROUPED BY DURABILITY,VALUE ADDED,
AND CONCENTRATION
To what extent does the reducedresponse of prices in successive business
recessions following 1949 reflect thebehavior of particulargroups of
prices? The answer will help identifywhich of various possibleinfluences may underlie this development. Threeclassifications of priceswere
selected for examination. Theypertain to the durability of theproduct, the ratio of value added in productionto shipments, and theconcentration of firms in the industry. The classificationby durability follows thefourfold BLS grouping of wholesale pricesas of 1967 into durable andnondurable manufactures, and durable andnondurable raw or slightlyprocessed goods. While the durablenonmanufactures comprise very fewseries in our
sample and have been omitted,the other threegroups are large enough to
allow comparison of the frequencydistributions of their prices. Value
added and concentrationcan be derived from the BLS assignmentof each
wholesale product price toa five-digit SIC industry, for which the1963
census of manufactures provides dataon value added and shipments' and
concentration.' These data arenot published for every five-digit industry,
so that some manufacturing prices hadto be omitted from these distribu-
tions in addition to the exclusionof all nonmanufacturing prices(farming
and mining). However,to minimize exclusions, value addedand ship-
ments for unavailable five-digit productcodes were approximated by the
corresponding four-digit code where thefive-digit product was the only
one in the four-digit group, though this inadvertentlyincorporates other
miscellaneous products of the four-digitindustry. Individual price series
were classified according to these ratios into low,middle, or high ratios of
value added to shipments and similarlyfor concentration.'Since these
two classifications are basedon 1963 data, they are less appropriate for
other years, but these characteristics ofthe products and the industriesare
not likely to have changed greatly evenover the two decades from 1948 to
1970; the task of reclassifying the prices usingother survey years was not
deemed worthwhile.
Although these classificationsare quite different in concept, they may in
fact overlap for many prices. Suchinterdependence of characteristicsRecession Behavior of Wholesale Prices, 1920'sand Post-W.W.11 83
makes identification of influences on pricebehavior difficult. Still, with the
large number of prices in our sample,there is sufficient diversification to
allow some indication of differences inbehavior.
Charts 9, 10, and 11 present cumulativefrequency distributions forall
the previous 1,100-odd product pricesexcept those omitted fromthese
classifications for the reasons noted.
Prices Classified by Degree ofProcessing and
Durability of Product
The group of largelyunprocessed goods isolates the rawmaterials, which
characteristicallY undergo large pricefluctuations. The rawmaterials aside,
the durability of manufacturedgoods affects their pricebehavior because
of differences between the rateof use and of purchase. Mostdurable
finished goods have variable uselives, arid replacement canbe postponed.
(The converse isnot invariably true,of course, since usersof some
nonessential nondurables can alsodo without for temporaryperiods.) This
classification also corresponds todegree of perishability,which determines
the feasibility of sizableinventories. Inventories absorbshort-run changes
in demand and also dampenprice fluctuations.Unfortunately, Chart 9
corresponds to this classificationonly roughly. The durablemanufactures
are not all finishedgoods, and the demand for someof them may remain
steady to maintain productionschedules of nondurable productsfor which
they are inputs. Furthermore, apartfrom perishable basic foods,the non-
durable group includes textiles,leather, paper, petroleum,chemicals, and
other such products classified asnondurable but regularlyheld in inven-
tory. No attempt wasmade to alter the B1.Sclassification for present
purposes. Nevertheless,the classification helps toshow whether the dura-
bility of products is related tothe changes in cyclical behaviorof prices.
Chart 9 reveals a sharpdifference between the largelyunprocessed
nondurable goods and the twomanufacturing groups. Asexpected, the
distributions of the former aremuch flatter, indicatingconsiderable disper-
sion of price responses tothe recessions. The smallernumber of series
covered by this group (aboutone-fifth of the other two)makes these
distributions more jagged butwould not ordinarily affecttheir slope or
median. The strong dependenceof these prices onshort-run market
conditions apparently is the reasonwhy these distributionsdo not shift
progressively rightward for eachrecession, as do those forthe two man-
ufacturing groups and for thecombined distributions in Chart 5.Indeed,
the distribution for 1970 inChart 9A is further to thelelt than that for 1958.
In the 1970 recession basiccommodity prices declined asusual, while in
1956-57 they weakened duringthe final stages of the businessexpansion

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3The distributions for the two manufacturing groups (Charts 9B and 9C)
are surprsigly similar, though as expected the durables exhibit somewhat
less price dispersion. Both sets show successive rightward shifts from one
recession to the next, but less for the durables than the nondurables except
in 1970. Apart from the raw materials, therefore, the rightward shifts in
successive recessions do not differ by durability and by inference are not
related to inventories.
Prices Classified by Ratio of Value Added to Shipments
A higher value-added ratio means that materials and fuels are less impor-
tant in the cost of production, and wages and salaries, which are less
responsive to short-run shifts in demand, play the main role. Of course,
labor costs are a component of materials too, but the proportionis
generally lower than for manufactures. A higher ratio gives less importance
to volatile prices of raw materials, and this explains why price dispersion
declines as the ratio increases. The average ratios in the three groups are
28, 50, and 66 per cent, respectively, and the dispersion roughly declines
commensurately between the first two groups, though by less between the
second two (see Table 7).
For each recession the medians of the distributions for each higher group
of ratios tend to move rightward, though much less so for the later than the
earlier recessions. Also, the distributions for the higher ratios cluster more
around zero and exhibit a response to recession which is smaller over-all
and changes less over the postwar period.
Taken all together, these results support the view that the inflexibility of
wage rates (due to custom as well as union bargaining) contributes to the
lack of responsiveness of prIce; t? ror,cions. whereas a high dependence
inproduction on raw materials adds to price dispersion. Yet the tendency
in successive recessions for the rate of change of prices to decline less or
rise more in relation to expansion rates cannot he attributed directly to
labor costs. These rightward shifts are largest for those prices having the
greatest dispersion and least dependence on wages. In the 1949 and 1954
recessions at the beginning of the postwar period, the high value-added
group displayed the least price response, but the subsequent rightward
shiftsin the distributions for this group were also the smallest. The
rightward shifts in the total distributions of Chart 5 reflect larger shifts by
thelower value-addedproducts.Therefore,whilethe well-known
inflexibility of wage costs contributes to the stability of prices, wage costs
do not appear to explain the general reduction in price responsiveness to
recessions.
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Prices Classified by Concentration Ratio
Conientratedindustrieshavelong beenlinkedtoshort-runprice
inflexibility, supposedly because they engage in oligopolistic price fixing
or, even without oveit collusion, set prices independently of short-run
market conditions.20 Quite apart from pricing by oligopolies, various
arguments can be devised why firms might prefer to avoid frequent price
changes, and concentration may help them to exercise that preference.
Market concentration ratios, however,may be a poor measure of the
control exercised over market prices. The available industry data often
exclude important substitutes and so do not follow themost relevant
market boundary. Furthermore, the number of dominant firmsin an
industry is by no means always a good index of the degree of competition.
Although profits are supposed to benefit from such controlover prices,
various studies have found concentration to he a poor indicator of profit
rates among industries.2! Despite these doubts and limitations, however,
the concentration ratio is used here to approximate the degreeto which
firms can set prices independently of immediate market conditions. This
use follows the common notion of "administered pricing," though that
concept is sometimes used differently to signify a specific strategy of
pricing, such as target-return or markup pricing. As originally used by
Gardner Means, administered pricing was defined by the frequency with
which firms changed their prices.22 For presentpurposes, however, this is
not a satisfactory classification because it is not independent of the price
series.
In Chart 11 the distributions for the more concentrated industriesgener-
ally show less price responsethey have smaller dispersion and lie closer
to zero, though this observation makes no allowance for the interrelation
between concentration, durability, and high value added, all of which
work in the same direction. To the extent that it is justified, this observation
supports the contention that in concentrated industries price adjustnients to
a change in sales are weaker; this presumably reflects a greater ability to
set prices independently of short-run market conditions. (As indicated in
Section IV, underreporting of market price shading does notappear to he
important for these distributions of changes in rates of change.)
Among the three groups, the smallest rightward shifts of the distributions
in successive recessions occur in the lowest concentrationgroup. The price
response of these industries, which is sharp, has not changed much over
the postwar period. Yet the rightward shifts are generally no rnaller in the
middle than in the high concentration group, and are somewhat larger in
the middle group for the 1 17O recession. It is hard tosee here an important
role for concentration in the postwar changes in price behavior, contrary to
the attention often paid to concentration. The tendency of pricesto90 Phillip Cagan
respond less in successive recessions does not reflect the special behavior
of highly concentrated industries, despite their weaker priceresponce
overall, but is a more general phenomenon.
Summary of Grouped Distributions
Certain groups of products reveal differences in the responsivenessof their
prices to recessions. Table 7 provides summary measures of thedistribu-
tions for durability, value added, and concentration. largerdeclines in
rates of price change are characteristic of low marketconcentration and
high materials costs, and these prices exhibitgreater dispersion. Such
differences are borne out by product groups (see AppendixTable C), in
which the farm, lumber, and leather industries with lowconcentration and
value added exhibit these characteristics themost. Nondurable products
display greater price dispersion but not in general largerdeclines in rates of
price change.
Apart from basic commodity markets where prices closelyfollow short-
run demand and supply conditions, wholesale prices exhibita pervasive
tendency to respond to recessions less and lessover the post'ar period.
This tendency does notappear to be dominated by the behavior ofany
particular group, though itis strongest for manufactures with lowvalue
added and medium concentration.
EVIl SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONOF FINDINGS
The failure of the aggregate indexof wholesale prices to decline in the
recessions of 1954 and 1958 and thenagain in 1961, which contrasted
with the sharp declines ofprevious recessions, wasa new phenomenon.
The change in behaviorwas attributed at the time to theemergence of
downward rigidity in prices anda tendency of producers to "administer"
their prices with less regard forshort-run shifts in market demand. Whydid
this phenomenonemerge following the 1949 recession? One explanation
given was the growth of marketpower of firms over prices and of labor
unions over wages, but it isnot clear that the changes in thestructure of
labor and product marketsimplied by this explanation have beensufficient
to account for the change in pricebehavior. Another explanationwas that
price settingis strongly influenced byaggregate-demand policies. The
Employment Act of 1946, whichhad committed thegovernment to pursue
high-employment policies,was followed in the postwar years by an
upward trend of prices, andthe two together reinforceda belief that any
deflationarypressures would be brief. Presumably thatgradually dissuadedfirms from reducing prices in recessions. Given periodic cyclical expan-
sions which increase prices, the failure of prices to undergo offsetting
declines during the ensuing recessions seemed sufficient at that time to
explain the upward trend of prices.23
The findings of this study of wholesale product prices partly modify these
views. First of all, the distributions of rates of price change in recessions
display a high dispersion, less than in the 1 920's but still considerable and
little changed in the past four recessions. The wide range of changes has
long been noted.24 It indicates the diversity of price behavior, reflecting
both random variations and persistent differences in volatility between
certain groups of prices. The dispersion of price changes was less in the
recessions following 1949 in part because of greater bunching at zero,
which was widely interpreted to imply a downward rigidity of prices. But
such bunching results largely from a bias toward zero change in reported
prices; the Stigler-Kindahl data for transaction prices in 1953 and 1961
shown in Section IV do decline moderately.
The emphasis on downward rigidity was not sufficient, in any event, to
explain the continuing rise of most prices in 1970 when the recession had
eliminated most excess demand pressures. Half of the prices in 1970 did
not even rise less rapidly than in the preceding expansion. While lags in
the system could be invoked to argue that prices continued rising to catch
up with previous cost increases, such lags had notbeen equally significant
in previous recessions. The new behavior required a revision of the
theories.
An important revision brought in the anticipated rate of inflation as a
basic determinant of price changes to which the effects of market demand
and supply conditions are then added.25 The anticipated rate supposedly
depends upon anticipated trends in unit costs at standard levels of capacity
utilization. Declines in demand reduce the rate of price change in relation
to the anticipated rate. A high anticipated rate makes the actual rate high
and, if demand subsequently declines, prices continue rising, albeit less
rapidly. Rising prices in 1970 could thus he explained by anticipated rates
of inflation higher than those in earlier recessions. (A theoretical formula-
tion of such price behavior is presented in the first section of the Appen-
dix.)
From this point of view the response of prices to recessions should be
measured by a decline in rates of change below the anticipated rates. In
the absence of an acceptable measure of anticipated rates, the preceding
expansion rates served here as rough proxies, though admittedly they are
far from perfect. The frequency distributions of changes in rates of price
change from expansions to ensuing recessions indicate how prices respond
to cyclical downturns. They also allow for differences in the trends of
prices and are equivalent to measures of overall cyclical amplitude.
J
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There is no doubt that thisamplitude has diminishedSince the 1920's and has continued to diminishin successj'erecessionsEXPaI1Sk)fland recession rates have both helped toreduce the cydicalcIniplifticle butthe attenuation of recession rates hashen greater. AcIecw of theseverity of recessions in businessactivity has contributedbut it doesnot providea full explanation, becausethe severity of thefive postwarrecessions in real terms has not decreasedchronologically. The1966-67minjrecessionWas exan-iined as an additionaltest case, and the sizeof itsresponse to prices fell chronologically betweenthat of therecessions of 1961 and1970 even though in terms of businessactivityit was lesssevere than thosetwo. Furthermore, although thedispersion ofrecession price changesamong products has decreasedsharply between theI920's and 1949,ithas remained the same since 1949.Developments in marketstructure arid mix which could stabilizeprice fluctuations wouldshow up in thedispersion of price changes. Sincedispersion has not(Iecreasecj since1949, Wemay conclude that thecontinued decline inresponse to recessions hasoccurred along the entiredistribution of pricechanges and doesnot reflect any alteration in marketstructure which also affectsdispersion (or, forthat matter, skewness andkurtosis as well, whichalso showno trends) Why have declinesfrom expansionsto recessions in therates of price change progressivelydiminished over thepostwar period? Theanswer cannot be that anticipatedrates of inflationrose. Although thatwas probably true, risinganticipated rates wouldnot account fordiminishing declines in therates of change Partof the answermay be that a reduction has occurred inthe magnitudeof priceresponses to excesscapacity because ofa growing general beliefthat inflationarymovements will not be reversed.If declines indemand growth havebeen brief, theprice response to the nextone will be less.Certainly thepostwar history of government failures tocurb inflationmust have affectedprice responses significantly In addition,a decline in demandis likely to reducethe rate of price changemainly to theextent that therate has risen abovethe anticipated rate duringthe businessexpansion. Thus priceincreases would presumably bereversed laster ina subsequentrecessionifthey had recently acceleratedthan if they hadbeen risingat a fairly constantrate for some time, thoughan offset to this fasterreversal is thepersistence of accelerated inflationwhile its laggedeffects on costswork through the economy Theanticipated rate ofinflation at the beginningof the 1970 recession may havebeen closerto the actualrate than had beentrue at previous cyclicalpeaks because therate of inflationat the end of 1969 had been about thesame for a yearor two. This would helpexplain why the average priceresponse was so slightin 1970. Have structuralchanges Occurredin productmarkets to account forthe decline in price
responses? There has,for exaniple beena steady growth in the relativeimportance of highlyspecialized and fabricatedproducts,Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices, 1920's and Post-W.W.II 93
which characteristically fluctuate less in price than doraw materials. But
this cannot account for the rightward shifts of the distributions, whichare
composed of the same set of prices. In a related classification of the prices
into durable and nondurable manufactures, the latter exhibited somewhat
larger rightward shifts than the former. The exception to successive shifts of
the distributions is shown by prices ofraw materials, which continue to
exhibit their characteristic sharp and variableresponses to market de-
velopments. Other classifications of prices which might be thoughtto
reveal structural changes are the concentration of markets and the ratio of
value added to shipments of producers. It is true that dispersion ofprice
changes is lower in more concentrated markets and for firms with high
value-added ratios. And the more concentrated markets exhibit fewer and
smaller price declines in the recessions. But these differences between
groups of prices have remained the same over the postwar period. The
price response to recessions of the high value-added and concentration
groups has declined the same or perhaps less than the others have.
Therefore, even if they had increased in relative importance, which isnot
generallytrue, they cannot account for the general decline in price
response.
The decisive influence on price responseappears to have been a general
adaptation of economic units to inflationary prospects rather than structural
developments, in which prices respond less to short-run fluctuations in
demand. Thus the change in price behavior appears to he longrange and
therefore not likely to change much either way within a fewyears. The
attenuation of price responses appears to have moderated cyclical acceler-
ations as well as decelerations of price changes about equallyacross
industries. The problem for aggregate-demand management is that the
upside moderation encourages the prolongation of expansive policies with
the attendant build-up of inflationary pressures which surface later, and the
downside moderation causes impatience with policy restraints. Both of
these tilt the resulting trend of prices upward.
APPENDIX
THE EFFECT OF PRiCE ANTICIPATIONS ON TI-liE DISTRIBUTION
OF PRICE CHANCESA THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This appendix develops a theoretical relationship between the kurtosis of
the distribution of price changes and the uniformity of price anticipations.
A smaller variability of anticipated rates o' inflation will reduce the
variability of the actual rates and will also, in combination with demand94
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influences on prices, increase the kurtosisof the distribution,though by very little. We begin by formulating the effectof excess demandand anticipations on price changes.
A Model of Price Changes
For each product wemay postulate demand and supply
schedules which are continually shifting upward because ofinflation (and rightwardbe cause of growth in real terms). The anticipatedrate of increase in theprice at their intersection point is which represents theanticipated rate of equilibrium price increase. Theanticipated level of the demandand supply schedules is not at any timenecessarily equal to the actuallevels D and S. The excess quantity demandedimplied by these actualschedules at the market price P is, forsome point in time, D-S, andwe may Suppose that this helps determine, (dP/Pdt), given an adjustment fractiona and distributed lag function Las follows:
(1)= aLID(P) -- S(P)l +
The lag function Laccounts for the time it takes forchanges in the prices of factor inputs to work throughthe price system. Sincemany manufactur ing firms appear to respondto an increase in demandinitially by depleting inventories or by lengtheningdelivery schedulesor by taking steps to
expand output and only laterby raising pricesas the upwardpressure on factor prices pushesup costs, a discrepancy betweendemand and supply can exist for some time beforeselling pricesare affected.
Actual prices rise alongthe anticipated path with deviations which depend witha lag upon D-S. The anticipatedpath changes slowlyover time, so that D-S doesnot remain always positiveor negative but moves cyclically above and belowthe anticipated path.
A change inaggregate demand is reflected inthe rate of change of demand D and affectsexcess demand D-S. (depends upon pastrates of price changeas well as information aboutfuture developments,Itis unrelated to currentexcess demand D-S. A specialcase is forto equal the anticipated risein unit costs ata 'standard" level of capacityutiliza- tion, Itis possible for Pto be rising even thoughD-S is negative. Thusa slowing ofaggregate demand makes 0-Snegative, so thatis less than fr, and 0 equals Sat a price lower thanthe current P.
Equation1implies correspondingadjustments in quantitiesto the dis- crepancy between D and S.Assuming thereare inventories, one possibility is that dollar salesare D(P) and the value ofproduction is S(P), so that the bracketed expressionis the unplannedchange in the value ofinventories (ignoring plannedchanges andrevaluations of inventorystocks due to price changes). Butthe actualamounts sold and produced mightnot be onRecession Behavior of Wholesale Prices, 1920'sand P.st-W.W.11 95
either schedule, though sales would beless than D. Thus D(P) is the
maxin'runi demand and S(P) the desiredproduction, hypothetical amounts
which the firm estimates through itsexperience in the market.
It is difficult to imagine equation 1without the price anticipations term,
for that would imply that price changesalways moved according to (a
lagged function of) excess demand. A movingequilibrium of rising prices
would then not be possible. Yet it seemsplausible that a fully anticipated
inflation could occur in which excessdemand at each moment was zero.
In general, however,could be above or below V.
If the anticipated rate of inflation werebelow the actual rate, prices
would be rising in part to reflect current, aswell as to catch up to past,
excess demand, the first termof equation 1. It is certainlyconceivable for
lagged excess demand to raise prices eventhoughwere above V and
there was a deficient current demand,that is, a negative D-S. Such a rise in
prices greater thanpe could be described as due to the push of past cost
increases not previously adjusted to.
When a higherhas persisted for a long time due tocontinuing excess
demand, becomes higher. Eventually the fastergrowth of demand is
fully anticipated and is no longer excessive.If then the rate of growth of
demand were to decline, D-S would turnnegative and begin to reduce .
Butdoes not immediately fall to alower rate commensuratewith the
lower rate of growth of demand, becausepe will continue to reflect the
preceding higher rate of growth and willdecline slowly, as it had previ-
ously risen slowly. This is the analyticalcounterpart of the statement inthe
Summary section that an inflation ratewhich comes to he anticipatedwill
resist a period of deficientdemand longer than a rate which isnot
anticipated.
The Distribution of p AcrossProducts
The distribution of p depends uponthe distribution of excessdemand and
of pe. It is plausible that deviationsof individual price changesfrom the
economy-wide mean rate of changereflect myriad small influencesand
therefore are normally distributed.The variance of the probabilitydistribu-
tions which generateindividual price changes differs amongproducts,
however, because of characteristicdifferences in the volatility of prices.
For a given point in time wehave, for each product i,
(2) = aLID1(P1) - S(P1)l 4.pet.
By the previous assumptionsthe first term follows anormal distribution
with some mean and a variance ifwhich are different for eachproduct,
and the second term isnormally distributed with some meanand a
variance cr22 which are the samefor all products. The assumptionthat themean and variance of are the same acrossp(O(IuCts iscrucial to the following argument, hutit seems reasonableas a first approximation-
The anticipated rate of pricechange for a productwill dependmainlyupon prospects for inflation in theeconomy at large andordinarily muchless upon developments in theindividual sectors.Individual firmswillassess these prospectsdifferently, ofcourse, but most of thereleventinfluences are the same and thereforethe (hstribUtiOfl ofperceived possihihtieswould generally be thesame.
Then jhas a distributionsubordinate toa normal probability
function in which the varianceof the normalfunction is determinedby a "directing process" withmean
m = (if2 -+ (712) = + (7.22,
and variance
s l(OL2 f r)ni2 = \(2(1(2)2.
The kurtosis ofthe subordinatednormal distributionis1
k=3(1+.
If the uniformity
across products of theanticipated rateof inflation changes, this isreflected ina smaller a22, whichreduces thevariability of ,by the sameamount. What happenstoitskurtosis? We have &n/&r2 and s/9u= 0. Therefore, from(5), the changein kurtosis with respectto a change in o22(in percentageterms in order toabstract from the arbitrarytime unit ofmeasurement of j),is
ik( (y22((,sa 2(1<
kI m' 1< km
Since theseparameters are allnecessarily positive,the effecton k is negative. In words,the kurtosisdepends upon thevariance of the "direct- ing process"as a percentage ofits mean squaredas in (5). The variance may be high absolutely,but, if themean is alsovery high, thepercentage variation in the"directingprocess" is small.Since a reductionin a2 reduces themean and therefore
increases thevariance of the"directing process" relativeto the mean, thereduction increasesthe kurtosis. As a roughindication ofmagnitude,m was 11.92 in)970 and kwas 16.4 (see Table6). We do notknowU2, the variance of



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eTABLE BForty-eight Subindexes Used in Charts 1 and 2
1926 1970
BLS Code Subindex WeightWeight
Oil
012






013 Livestock 6.71 2.85 1
014 Poultry
.51 .255
015 Plant and animal fibers 3.88 .437
016 Fluid milk 2.87 2.081
017 Eggs .99 .510
018 Hay, hayseeds, and oilseeds 1.13 .694
019 Other farm products (coffee, beans, tea,
tobacco, and nuts) 1.17 .835
021 Cereal and bakery products 4.27 2.017
022 Processed meats, poultry, and fish 9.59 4.153
023 Dairy products 2.53 2.300
024 Processed fruits and vegetables .63 .866
025 Sugar and confectionary products 2.44 1.268
0272 Crude vegetable oils .45 .165
0291 Cattle feed .43 .186
031 Cotlon products 3.44 1.086
032 Wool products 2.50 .346
037 Miscellaneous textiles (jute, rope & twine) .97 .1 32
041 Hides and skins .77 .077
042 Leather .84 .179
043 Footwear 1.77 .694
051 Coal 6.87 .700
052 Coke .93 .092
056 Crude petroleum 3.06 .628
057 Refined petroleum products 4.48 3.459
0622 Paint materials .65 .212
0651 Mixed fertilizers .28 .181
0652 Fertilizer materials .32 .211
0711 Crude rubber
.81 .201
0712 TiresaridtubeS 1.73 .611
081 Lumber 2.61 1.259
0911 Woodpulp .29 .274
0913 Paper 1.08 1.314
0914 Paperboard .34 .426
1010 Ironand steel 4.80 4.797
1020 Nonferrous metals 2.11 3.376
1050* Plumbing fixtures and brass 0.00 .181
1110 Agricultural machinery and equipment .21 .705
1210 Household furniture 1.21 .925
1230 floorcove:ings .46 .336
1320 Concrete ingredients .96 .630$
TABLE B(conc'uded)
1926 1970
BLS Code Subindex WeightWeight
SOURCE:1926 weights: Wholesale Prices 1913 to 1927, Bureau of Labor Statistics BulletinNo. 473 (Jan
1929), Appendix B, pp. 251-62. 1970 weights: December 1970 relative
mport5nce of "lormer" index (based on 1963 shipments), Bureau of Eabor Staiktiçs,tVholesjk P'Is & Price Indexes for Jan. 1971 (July 1971), Tahle i6.
NOTE:Coding is based on 1967 revision.
Omitted for924 recession in ChartIand also 1927 in Chart 2.
1 360* Asphalt roofing o.00 .120
1391 Building lime .04 006
141101 Passengercars 5.40 5.265 141102* Motortrucks 000 915
1522* Cigars 0.00 .091
1 523 Other tobacco products .69 .063


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The BLS index begins iii 1890. TheWarren-pearson ifldex ofwholesa(e pricesCoveriig 1854 to 1890 (not shown) rose in the finaltwo (1887 and 1890) ofthe SeVen
recessi055 in that Period.
For an analysis of specific cyclesin the rates ot change of
wholesale pricessee Geoffrey H. Moore, The Cy heal Behaviorof PricesEhireau of laborStatistics Report 384 (1971),
Milton Friedman and AnnaI.Schwartz, A MonetaryHistory of theVnjte/ States 1867-1960 (Ness' York: National Bureauof Economic Research,1963), Table 25,p 594 Harry B. McAllister, "Statist;calFactors 'sifecting the Stabilityof the Wholele
and Consumers' Price Indexes," ThePrice Statistics of the Federal
Grwernnie01 Reportof the Price Statistics Review Committee(New York: National Bureauof Economic
Research, 1961), pp. 373-418.
McAllister also examined the numberof reporters perindividual Price series,which has generally increased. Theuse of more reprjrts for each Seriesincreases theprobabjlj, of catching and recordingsmall changes in marketprices, hut averagingthe reports tends to smooth themovements in individual pricequotations The effectOfl cyclical anipltude however is probablyminor.
4Allan D. Searle,"weightRevisions in the WholesalePrice Index,t8901960," Monthly Labor Recesv (February1962): 175-82.
5This can be shownas follows. Suppose an index Zis composed ofn prices tx), all svith the same weight andvariance & and a correlationcoefficient R ss'ith eachother. (This example abstracts from changesin the weighting andvariance of new itemsand concentrates on changes in numberof items only.)
Z'Sn
and u'=and br alli
Then
For large n, thisapproachesfrom above. Hence thevariance of tile index willnot under theseassumptions decline murh forincreases in n beyonda moderate size. The rate of changegises different rankingsthan the total changewould, since the durations of therecessions vary Iron-i 9 to14 months but for thepost-Vorld War II recessions which vary onlyfrom 9 to 12 months,the sariation is less The 1924 distributionxshich in Table 2 hasthe largest meanrate of decline except for t949, appears to berepresentatixe ot earlierrecessions back to the earls1890's in both the mean anddispersion of therates of change. Thisobserx-ation is basedon the distribution of specificcycles in over 100wholesale price series. SeeFrederick C. Mills, ThBehavio, of Prices)Nesv York: NationalBureau of Economic Research1927), Table 139, p. 421.
Rankings of seserity basolels' on GNP in
constant doilars are somess hat different but also out ofchronological order.Hossper aggregared0llmeasures follossa chronologjcai ordermore closely. For dollarGNP. onl953-54 and 1957-58are Out of chronologicalorder of decliningseverity And dollarpersonal income follows theRecession Behavior of Wholesale Prices, 1920'sand Post-W,W.11 103
chronological order exactly. Of course, dollar measuresmisrepresent the pressures of
vu 055 capacity on prices.Nevertheless, the rankings of severity in Chart 7based on
general business activity should be viewed as a crudeordering of the cyclical pressures
on prices.
9The number of prices included here is 1,104, 34less than in Chart 5 (the 32 series not
covering the 1970 recession were excludedhere from all the distributions, aswell as
two other series omitted inadvertently).These minor differences in total numberof series
are of no consequence.
In Table 3 the means were computed fromthe individual rates of change. butthe
average deviations in Table 4 arebased on midpoints multiplied by frequenciesof the
closed class intervals and on sums of theindividual rates of the open-end intervals.
Because of bunching at zero, the midpoint ofthe 0 to 2Y2 interval overstates theactual
mean of this class and biases the averagedeviation upward except when the meanis
above the midpoint of that class as in 1970. However,this bias is bound to be small,
and a correction was not made.
See the exchange in the American Economic Reviewbetween Gardner C. Means (lune
1972), pp. 292-306, and George Stigler and )amesKindahl (Sept. 1973). pp. 717-21.
George Stigler and James Kindahl, The Behaviorof Industrial Prices (New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1970), p. 23.
For price changes in the interval -2½ to 2½ per cent per year,the percentage declining
in 1958 is 45.45 per cent by the NBER dataand 5.26 per cent by the BLS data, and in
1961, 67.87 and 15.15 per cent, respectively.This implies that 40.19 and 52.71 per
cent of the BLS series in 1958 and 1961,respectively, should be shifted from the interval
between 0 and 2½ to tess than zero. These percentages wereapplied to manufactures
with concentration ratios above 33 per cent only and not toall series in that interval on
the s'iew that the rionnianulacturing and lowestconcentration industries are less likely to
display bunching at zero. This also reduces the sizeof the adjustment. (The elimination
of low concentration industries is consistent withthe analysis of Section V and with
numerous studies in the literature onpricing in concentrated industries.) For 1958,there
are 212 series shiftedin this way and for 1961, 295 series,which results in the
percentages reported in the text.
14See Mills, Behavior of Prices, especially Figure45, p. 343. and Wesley C. Mitchell, The
Making and Using of Index Numbers, Bureau ofL.abor Statistics Bulletin No. 656 (March
1938), reprinted from Bulletin No. 284 (1921),especially pp. 14.-21.
On the kuitosis of the sequence of individual pricechanges over time, see Benoit
Mandelbrot, "The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices,"Journal of Business (October
1963): 394-419, and Peter K. Clark.,"ASubordinated Stochastic Process Model with
Finite Variance for Speculative Prices" Econometrica(Jan. 1973): 135-55.
See Clark, "Subordinated Stochastic ProcessModel." I have benefited from discussions
with Clark on the application of subordinatenormal distributions to the present data.
These data cover total shipments of establishmentsin the industry and therefore cover
all products, not just the main one on whichclassification of the establishment is based.
This produces some error in our classificationof prices.
The traction of total indu5try shipments by thefour largest firms was used, n a few cases
where the four-firm ratio for 1963 was notavailable, the concentration ratio for 1958
was used if the eight-firm ratiosuggested that the concentration of the industryhad not
changed much between 1958 and 1963.
The dividing lines were, for the value-added ratio,0-.400, .401 -.600, and .601-1.000
and, for concentration, 0-33, .34-67, and.68-1.00. These boundaries were chosen to
provide wide intervals each of whichwould contain a fairly large number of price
series.